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Long-distance connections loom large in global history.  Their study, alongside 
comparative history and the history of common experiences, can be seen as one of three 
alternative approaches in this emerging field.1  The present chapter combines elements of all 
three approaches; here, we begin to look at connections comparatively, while also isolating 
elements of common experience.  We examine long-distance trade in and between Europe, 
the Mediterranean, and West Africa, focusing on the period between about AD 1000 and 
1600.2  Many of the questions we pose could be applied to other regions, but a certain level of 
detail is needed in order to say anything meaningful about trust.   
As the practice of global history matures, acquiring greater time-depth, new ways of 
looking at connectivity and long-distance relationships are necessary.  Economic history has 
tended to see the problems of information, uncertainty and risk in long-distance trade as 
logistical and symptomatic of pre-modern conditions.  Their solution has been seen to lie in 
the development of features of the modern firm: institutional and documentary technologies 
such as banks, accounting, money, commercial associations, insurance loans, underwriting, 
                                                          
1 James Belich, John Darwin, and Chris Wickham, ‘Introduction’, in Belich, Darwin, 
Margaret Frenz, and Wickham (eds.), The Prospect of Global History (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 
3-22. 
2 Because written texts are very rare for the medieval period in West Africa we also draw 




contracts, and so on.3  This is despite healthy currents in economic anthropology that have 
pointed out the importance of studying people and their behaviour as well as the rules of the 
market.4  
Questions of trust in fact lie at the root of many of the problems faced by long-distance 
traders across the globe.  Should one rely upon the cooperation of partners, agents, or clients 
whose behaviour cannot be directly monitored – and if so under what conditions?  How can 
the inherent risks to buyers who pay in advance and sellers who offer credit be surmounted?5  
                                                          
3 Peter Spufford, Power and Profit: the Merchant in Medieval Europe (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 2002), 30-8; Robert S. Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-
1350 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 76-9; Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant Trade in the 
Later Middle Ages (Princeton: PUP, 1983), 372-81; John H. Munro, ‘The International Law 
Merchant and the Evolution of Negotiable Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low 
Countries’, in Munro, Textiles, Towns and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-
Medieval England and the Low Countries (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), X, 49-80; Jenny 
Kermode, Medieval Merchants: York, Beverley and Hull in the Later Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 207-11. 
4 Marie Perinbam, ‘The Julas in Western Sudanese History: Long-Distance Traders and 
Developers of Resources’, in B.K. Swartz and  R.E. Dumett (eds.), West African Culture 
Dynamics (The Hague: Mouton, 1980), 455-475;  Paul Seabright, The Company of Strangers: 
a Natural History of Economic Life (Princeton: PUP, 2004). 
5 Abner Cohen, ‘Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas’, in Claude 
Meillassoux and Daryll Forde (eds.), The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in 
West Africa (Oxford: OUP, 1971), 266; T.H. Lloyd, The English Wool Trade in the Middle 




In circumstances where commercial transactions rarely involved the simultaneous exchange 
of goods and payment, trust was clearly fundamental to the creation and maintenance of 
relationships and networks.6  However, general surveys of medieval trade typically do little 
more than occasionally allude to its significance.  For instance, one recent history of business 
in medieval Europe stresses the importance of trust, but diminishes it as an object of study by 
equating it with innate honesty or the supposedly-natural fact of kinship.7  Some scholars 
have even gone so far as to deny the importance of trust, arguing instead that uncertainty is 
dealt with by the calculation of costs and benefits.8  But for others, trust is a problem 
demanding detailed discussion.  Niklas Luhmann tackled the issue of calculation head-on, 
arguing that trust is the means by which people reduce the complexity of calculating risk.  
Charles Tilly similarly saw trust as an imperative, arising from the frequent and necessary 
experience of placing valued outcomes at risk from the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of 
                                                          
6 Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: the Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno and 
Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven: Yale UP, 2009); David 
Sebouh Aslanian, From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean : the Global Trade Networks 
of Armenians from New Julfa (Berkeley: UCO, 2010). 
7 Edwin S. Hunt and James M. Murray, A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-
1550 (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 56-7, 148, 158; also Damien Coulon, Barcelone et le Grand 
Commerce d’Orient au Moyen Âge: un Siècle de relations avec ‘Égypte et la Syrie-Palestine 
(ca. 1330 – ca. 1430) (Madrid-Barcelone: Casa de Velázquez, 2004), 599. 
8 Richard Sosis, ‘Does Religion Promote Trust’, Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on 
Religion, 1 (2005), 1-30; K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: an 
Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge : CUP, 1985); Lopez, 




others.9  Luhmann’s observation on complexity has been enormously influential, as has his 
articulation of a distinction between trust in persons and trust in institutions; but in common 
with much of the discussion of trust by economists, the interpretative utility of this body of 
work is blunted by a tendency to generalise and simplify, even where some attempt at 
historical contextualization is made.10   Instead, we propose a less absolute dichotomy 
between trust in persons and in institutions, and a more multi-faceted characterization of trust 
and trustworthiness.  
In this we follow, to a certain extent, the growing literature on European credit and 
contract enforcement that has begun to treat trust as a crucial problem, as well as studies of 
long-distance trade along ‘spindly networks’ in Africa, Asia and Europe, examining the 
means by which trust was fostered in the principal-agent relationship.  This is becoming a key 
question in global economic and social history, and some medieval and early modern 
historians have begun to view trust as a cultural as well as economic phenomenon.11  We aim 
                                                          
9 Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (Chichester, 1979); Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 
10 Dorothea Weltecke, ‘Trust: Some Methodological Reflections’, in P. Schulte, M. Mostert, 
I. van Renswoude (eds.), Strategies of Writing: Studies on Text and Trust in the Middle Ages 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 379-92.  
11 Steven A. Epstein, ‘Secrecy and Genoese Commercial Practices’, Journal of Medieval 
History, 20 (1994), 313-25; Gabriele Signori, Schuldenwirtschaft: Konsumenten- und 
Hypothekarkredite im spätmittelalterlichen Basel (Munich: UVK, 2015); Craig Muldrew, 
The Economy of Obligation: the Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern 
England (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Søren Sindbæk, ‘The Small World of the Vikings: 




to open the subject up further still, by showing that whatever institutional arrangements are 
adopted, trust has always been a human decision and emotion, not something easily legislated 
for.  In taking this approach we do not, however, simply align ourselves with the main 
alternative interpretation of long-distance relationships: that which holds trust to be 
underpinned by shared religious, familial, or cultural identity, as we shall see below.  Instead 
we are working with Bernard Williams’ critique of the tendency to be content with ‘macro-
motivations’, and Timothy Guinnane’s view that social context is everything in attempting to 
understand trust.12  We will examine how trust was a set of values, a suite of emotions, a 
conversation involving speech-acts and physical performance, and a way of negotiating the 
spaces in which relationships were conducted. 
                                                          
Review, 40 (2007), 59–74; Anne Haour, ‘What made Islamic Trade Distinctive - As 
Compared to Pre-Islamic Trade?’ ,in David Mattingly, Victoria Leitch, Chloë Duckworth, 
Aurélie Cuenod, Martin Sterry and Franca Cole (eds.), Trade in the Ancient Sahara and 
Beyond, Trans-Saharan Archaeology, 1 (Cambridge: CUP and The Society for Libyan 
Studies, 2017), 80-100; Jessica Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval 
Mediterranean: the Geniza Merchants and their Business World (Cambridge: CUP, 2012); 
Trivellato, Familiarity of Strangers; Aslanian, Indian Ocean to Mediterranean; Ghislaine 
Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade Networks, and Cross-Cultural 
Exchange in Nineteenth-Century West Africa (Cambridge: CUP, 2009); Francesca Trivellato, 
Leor Halevi and Cátia Antunes (eds.), Religion and Trade: Cross-Cultural Exchanges in 
World History, 1000-1900 (Oxford: OUP, 2014). 
12 Bernard Williams, ‘Formal Structures and Social Reality’, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: 
Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford, 1988), 3-13, at 11; Timothy W. 




In many discussions trust is only treated as a problem in long-distance relationships.  
Local relationships are classically imagined within a face-to-face society, where everyone 
knows everyone else and economic interaction is embedded in a host of other familial and 
social relationships.  This has been described as ‘thick trust’ or ‘mechanical solidarity’.13  The 
antithesis of the imagined village is the transaction conducted over long distances, which is 
assumed to involve ‘thin trust’ based on limited knowledge and purely economic 
relationships.  Although this dichotomy usefully introduces questions of scale, it supports a 
seductive yet false distinction between an unconnected pre-modern world in which life was 
lived locally, and a connected modern world in which life is lived globally.  It also promotes 
the idea that trust operates on either the local or the global scale; that it is thick or thin, easy 
or difficult.  The medieval evidence however indicates a complex continuum of trust 
practices in every setting where life is lived beyond the immediate; from journeys of a few 
miles to long voyages across oceans or deserts. 
The need for a historically-situated examination of trust does not suggest itself merely 
because of the inadequacies of the ‘macro-motivations’, such as religion or economic 
rationality.  The medieval and later texts describing trans-Saharan, Mediterranean and 
northern European trade themselves employ a variety of discourses in which trust is explicitly 
and implicitly evoked.  These written sources include travel literature and geographies, 
                                                          
13 ‘Mechanical solidarity’ derives from Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail social 
(Paris, 1930), contrasted with the organic solidarity of modernity; the multi-stranded 
character of pre-modern relationships is classically expressed in Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation (New York: Farrer and Rinehart, 1944); ‘thick trust’ is Bernard Williams’ 
phrase in ‘Formal Structures’.  For an unreasonably stark division between modernity and 




business letters and contracts, and the judicial records of commercial disputes.  As such they 
privilege certain overarching frameworks like law, the state, literacy, and masculinity, but 
they also frequently speak of other relevant concepts like friendship, family, belief, and 
emotion.  Where possible we have also drawn on archaeological data and concepts in order to 
explore trust cultures, but here too there is a bias towards social forms leaving more tangible 
traces, privileging permanent over temporary settlements for example.   
Although we do not believe that institutions can wholly account for the extension of 
trust across long distances, it is difficult to imagine any trading situation where law and 
government did not at least figure in the imaginations of the parties. The maximal case can be 
illustrated from those instances where a high degree of confidence was sustained at least in 
part because the trading partners knew that default was punishable by a legal authority.  For 
example, the thirteenth-century wool trade between English farmers and French and Italian 
merchants involved many contracts to buy wool wholesale in advance of the sheep-shearing 
season (Map 1).  This gave the dealer a preferential price and the producer a guaranteed sale.  
In October 1259, Stephen de Chaendut recognized that he owed six sacks of good wool to the 
‘Cahorsin’ merchant society represented by Arnaud Griffun, Imbert Rok and William 
Fresepayn.  He was to deliver the wool at Boston fair in July 1260.  As security his lands and 
chattels were forfeit to the value of the sale, and could be confiscated by the ‘barons of the 
Exchequer’.14  These ominous agents of royal power loom over all such records of debt and 
advance sale.  They were the ultimate enforcers of contracts and guarantors of trust in 
medieval England, and their principal sanction involved knowing the location of people’s 
                                                          
14 Advance Contracts for the Sale of Wool c. 1200 – c. 1327, ed. Adrian Bell, Chris Brooks, 





lands and goods and being able to confiscate or occupy them to extract payment.  This was 
also attractive to merchants from outside that jurisdiction. 
The weight of institutions is demonstrably true in many regions where direct evidence 
of contracts and enforcement survives.15  Even where no such evidence exists we can 
nonetheless see authority-seeking behaviour amongst merchants.  Islamic writing dealing 
with the meeting of North African and Middle Eastern travellers with the people of the 
Sahara and its southern edge indicates that order and security were paramount concerns (Map 
7).16  Ibn Hawqal, writing in the tenth century, is explicit, drawing attention to places where it 
was thought that ‘the orderly government of kingdoms is based upon religious beliefs, good 
manners, law and order, and the organization of settled life directed by sound policy’, while 
observing that those who lack these qualities ‘do not deserve to be dealt with separately.’  For 
Mediterranean Muslim writers such as al-Bakrī (eleventh century), Ibn Said (thirteenth 
century), and Ibn Battuta (fourteenth century), eating wheat, wearing particular clothes or 
                                                          
15 Besides parchment and paper records, some of the materially most ephemeral evidence is 
the corpus of birch bark agreements from twelfth-century Novgorod: T.S. Noonan and R.K. 
Kovalev, ‘What Can Archaeology Tell Us About How Debts Were Documented and 
Collected in Kievan Rus’?’, Russian History, 27 (2000), 119-54. 
16 Nehema Levtzion and John F. P. Hopkins, Corpus of early Arabic Sources for West 
African history (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2000). See also Tim Insoll, ‘The External 
Creation of the Western Sahel’s Past: The Use and Abuse of the Arabic Sources’, 
Archaeological Review from Cambridge, 13 (1994), 39-49 for a discussion of the prejudices 




using certain types of architecture were markers of familiarity, and perhaps trustworthiness, 17 
but their insistence on the importance of law and order trumps any concerns over way of life.  
A geographical treatise written for the Norman king of Sicily by the Moroccan-born al-Idrīsī 
in 1154 draws the reader’s attention to the presence of legal authorities in the Senegal valley:  
Sila, on the northern bank of the river ... is a metropolis, a meeting place ... and a good 
market ... Sila belongs to the domains of the Takruri, who is a powerful ruler.  He has 
slaves and soldiers, strength and firmness as well as widely-known justice.  His 
country is safe and calm. Tiraqqa is one of the towns of the Wanqara.  It is a large 
town, inhabited by many people, but it has no surrounding wall nor enclosure. Tiraqqa 
is subject to the ruler of Ghana, in whose name the khutba [sermon] is delivered, and 
to whom the people go in litigation.18   
However, there is no clear evidence that West African rulers provided justice in 
disputes between local and foreign merchants, while in European monarchies, it is clear that 
local and informal means of guaranteeing trust were also crucial elements as well as more 
formal mechanisms.  For instance, in the English wool transaction described above, alongside 
the distant threat of royal coercion two men are named as ‘mainpernors’ (sureties) for the 
                                                          
17 Levtzion and Hopkins, Corpus, 68, 85, 188, 301, 303; see especially 185, also 401, n. 15 
for a comment on indications of changes in the material culture as a result of contact with 
foreign merchants and the spread of Islam. 
18 Levtzion and Hopkins, Corpus, 107, 111. The khutba was the Friday prayer, which could 
include a sermon signalling political allegiances; for parallels see Elizabeth Lambourn, ‘India 
from Aden – Khutba and Muslim Urban Networks in Late Thirteenth-Century India’, in 
Kenneth R. Hall (ed.), Secondary Cities and Urban Networking in the Indian Ocean Realm, 




debtor.  They would supply the wool or its cash value if the principal could not.  Despite the 
presence of royal authority, informal and personal means of buttressing trust were, in this and 
similar ways, frequently sought out.19  We should not be led by the creation and survival of 
impressive judicial archives into thinking that political authority was always, or ever, the 
main means by which trust was maintained.  Indeed, as Steven Epstein points out, judicial 
enforcement was the sign of a failed relationship, something to be avoided, and David 
Aslanian has argued that trust was in itself beneficial, reducing ‘transaction costs.’20  And 
trust could flourish in situations where the role of institutions was much more ambiguous.  
An increasingly well-studied example of this emerges from the contents of the Cairo 
‘Geniza’, a repository of discarded letters and documents from Fustat, the commercial centre 
of the Fatimid caliphate.  Arabic-speaking Jewish merchants, now often known as the 
Maghribi traders, spanned the Mediterranean and the Near East, appearing in Baghdad, 
Persia, India, Syria, Egypt, the Levant, Byzantium, North Africa, Sicily, and Iberia.  The 
Geniza material is extraordinarily rich, but historians disagree on its interpretation.  How far 
did the merchants rely upon judicial authorities in maintaining the bonds of trust necessary to 
ship goods and procure services across long distances?  The merchants’ letters make much of 
informal and familial connections, as in this example of a draft note, prepared in 1036 by an 
older merchant in Tunisia for his younger associate in Egypt:  
So-and-so sent me a letter suggesting - which I intended to do anyhow - that you two 
should cooperate.  When you travel to Busir you take the trouble to purchase for him 
what he needs, while he will take care of oil and soap. When you tarry here you will 
look here after his affairs, while he will travel to Egypt and make purchases for you 
                                                          
19 Advance Contracts, items, 3, 81. 




and for himself, for he is an expert in flax and other goods. I shall be very pleased 
with this friendship between the two of you. For he will take Abu Sa'id's [the writer's 
cousin’s] place with you.  I need not stress this matter any further, for your success 
depends on it.21 
Here there is no mention of contractual arrangements such as those seen in the English 
advance sale of wool.  No external authorities are mentioned, and yet instructions are given 
and relationships of dependency hinted at.  This evidence is, however, ambiguous. Avner 
Greif has postulated that the Maghribi traders inhabited a private-order enforcement network, 
in which the fear of losing one’s reputation as an honest dealer and trustworthy agent, as well 
as the ability of the network to communicate honesty or default, were enough to make it 
possible to trust an agent without a formal contract.  But others have ruled this out.  Sheilagh 
Ogilvie and Jonathan Edwards have claimed that the traders did in fact use courts to settle 
disputes, while Jessica Goldberg has argued that in most cases the fear of legal action proved 
sufficiently effective.22 
In West Africa too, historians disagree.  Lucie Colvin, in her study of late-eighteenth 
century Hausaland, argues for the tight governmental control of trade, suggesting that rulers 
regulated how and where markets could be established, what merchandise could be sold, and 
                                                          
21 S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: the Jewish Communities of the Arab World as 
Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, 6 vols. (Berkeley: UCPress, 1967-93), i. 
165. 
22 Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval 
Trade (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 58-90; Jonathan Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvie, ‘Contract 
Enforcement, Institutions, and Social Capital: the Maghribi Traders Reappraised’, Economic 




what price asked; similarly Lars Sundstrom states that on the Kano market prices were 
regulated by the ruler.23  However, both appear to base their interpretations on an ambiguous 
passage written by the British traveller Hugh Clapperton in the 1820s, who declared that rates 
at the Kano market were set by the ‘market chief’.24  Clapperton’s testimony gives no 
indication that this market chief was acting on behalf of the political authorities; it is equally 
possible that she or he was chosen by the merchants to maintain order. Certainly, as 
Clapperton himself tells us, the revenues from the market formed part of the ruler’s income, 
and these revenues presumably derived from the commissions on sales and the rental fee for 
stalls which the market chief collected. But the chief may not have been the sole market 
authority, and others may have claimed the right of taxation.25  
Besides the view that trust was primarily created by the presence of political and legal 
authority, the major alternative explanation has been the existence of a shared culture among 
traders.  Abner Cohen and Philip Curtin have popularized the model of trade diasporas, 
                                                          
23 Lucie Colvin, ‘The Commerce of Hausaland, 1780-1833’, in D. McCall and N. Bennett 
(eds.), Aspects of West African Islam (Boston: African Studies Centre, 1971), 101-135; Lars 
Sundström, The Exchange Economy of Pre-Colonial Tropical Africa (Guildford: Billing and 
Sons, 1974). 
24 Colvin, ‘Commerce’, 108; Sundström, Exchange Economy, 62; Hugh Clapperton, Dixon 
Denham and Walter Oudney, Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in North and Central 
Africa in the Years 1822, 1823 and 1824, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1828), ii. 253 
25 Polly Hill, ‘Notes on Traditional Market Authority and Market Periodicity in West Africa’, 
Journal of African History 7:2 (1966), 295-311. The attractiveness of trade to rulers as a 
source of revenue is a reminder that it was not always wise for merchants to rely utterly on 




bound together by identity and dispersed across the region of trade.26  For instance, across 
much of the ‘old world’ the economic networks formed by Jews have often been cited as 
classic trading diasporas.  Joshua Holo makes an uncontroversial point when he writes that 
the Jews of the Byzantine Empire in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were linked by 
shared languages (Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek) and ‘the trust engendered by familiarity.’27  
Many historians have made similar arguments, some showing how multiple cultural traits 
were sometimes shared by itinerant or diaspora minority groups.  Muslim merchants involved 
in both trans-Saharan and Mediterranean trade were often religious scholars as well, while 
Jewish brokers of trade in West Africa were often also blacksmiths, living on the edge of 
settlements in spatial as well as cultural terms.28  Shared beliefs and practices may well have 
contributed to close affinity and the trust necessary for trade, while other historians have 
noted a more defensive ‘togetherness ... strengthened by the special dangers of minority 
status.’29 Marie Perinbam, who has considered the role of diaspora trade networks in West 
African history, has discussed how Hausa and Jula (also known as Dyoula) merchants 
negotiated relationships with their host communities; she concludes that ‘[m]aintaining 
                                                          
26 Cohen, ‘Cultural strategies’; Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1984), 1-14. 
27 Joshua Holo, Byzantine Jewry in the Mediterranean Economy (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 
63. 
28 Olivia Remie Constable, Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: the Commercial 
Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900-1500 (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 55-6; Levtzion, 
‘Merchants vs. Scholars and Clerics in West Africa’, in Levtzion and Fisher, Rural and 
Urban Islam in West Africa (1986); Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails, 65-70. 




social, cultural, and political distance from their host communities made possible the jula 
imprint on West Africa cultural pluralities’, noting that ‘the politics of jula culture revolved 
around shared ethnic and religious affinities, common patronyms, language, myths of a 
homeland, contracts and social connections, the seeking and granting of favors, honesty, 
trust, and a host of intangibles which bound rooted hierarchical societies, on the one hand, to 
an extremely mobile trading group, on the other’.30 
Trading groups might also cultivate a collective reputation for trustworthiness.  We 
may see the effects of this in Ibn Hawqal’s tenth-century description of the inhabitants of 
Sijilmāsa (modern Morocco) as  
well-bred in their actions and perfect in morals and deeds. In their manners they do 
not share the pettiness of the other people of the Maghrib in their dealings and 
customs, but act with great frankness. They are known for their ready charity and 
show a manly concern for one another. Though there are among them some old feuds 
and quarrels they put them aside in time of need and cast them away out of the 
nobility, forgiveness, and natural generosity which are peculiar to them, and the good 
manners which they have acquired in their numerous travels, long periods of absence 
from home, and separation from their country.31  
Ibn Hawqal is explicit about the link between minority status, trade specialization, and 
the experience of being a resident alien minority.   Immediately after this paragraph he 
recounts the story of a debt of 42,000 dinars owed to someone from Sijilmāsa by another 
Sijilmāsa resident currently in Awdaghust, two months’ travel away – a story which 
impressed him greatly. “I have never seen or heard anything comparable to this story in the 
                                                          
30 Perinbam, ‘The Julas’, 472, 463-4. 




east. I told it in al-‘Iraq, in Fars, and in Khurasan, and everywhere it was regarded as a 
novelty”.32 The implication here is that extraordinary levels of trust existed over vast 
distances and were constructed around shared affiliation.  Despite Ibn Hawqal’s 
astonishment, however, such practices must have been rather common. 
In African history the assumption has often been that Islam provided a network to 
believers, facilitating trade between people even though not personally acquainted. The 
names of sub-Saharan West African towns and kingdoms first reached outside ears through 
Muslim traders, and the cosmopolitanism of a place like Zawila (now in Libya), where in the 
late ninth century traders from Khurasan (modern Iran), Basra, and Kufa (both in modern 
Iraq) were operating, hung on its belonging to the dar al Islam – perhaps even more 
specifically, to the minority Ibadi network 33. Titles indicating religious or legal Islamic 
expertise – already mentioned by al-Bakrī, who states that Ghana had salaried imams and 
muezzins, as well as jurists and scholars34 – suggest established frameworks, as does the 
almost casual assumption of long-distance communications, visible in Ibn Battuta’s evidence 
three centuries later: ‘Anyone who has no associate [at Walata, modern Mauritania] writes to 
one of the merchants known for his honesty and he acts as his partner in the matter…’35 
In the most recent research on the activities of the eleventh-century Jewish merchants 
whose letters survived in the Cairo Geniza, a self-conscious cultivation of exclusive religious 
identity has likewise been emphasized as the basis for long-distance trust.  Phillip Ackerman-
                                                          
32 Nehemia Levtzion, ‘Ibn-Hawqal, the Cheque, and Awdaghost’, The Journal of African 
History, 9 (1968), 223-233. Page 225 
33 Levtzion and Hopkins, Corpus, 22 and 378, YbB note 1. 
34 Levtzion and Hopkins, Corpus, 79. 




Lieberman argues that while earlier historians such as Shelomo Dov Goitein and Abraham 
Udovitch understood these merchants to have operated in accordance with an Islamic ‘law 
merchant’, many of their business practices were in fact modelled on distinctively Jewish 
customs that occurred at a range of moments in life when a heightened formality was called 
for.  Commercial partnerships were initiated by ‘qinyan’, a rite also used in property 
purchases and marriages to create obligations between parties.36  In several areas of 
commercial practice, Ackerman-Lieberman shows how despite certain parallels between 
Jewish and Islamic law and business practice that might have enabled the Geniza merchants 
to use the courts of the majority Muslim culture, they chose instead to cleave to legal 
procedures and discourses that were distinctively Jewish and, moreover, absent from classical 
Islamic legal texts.  Ackerman-Leiberman’s analysis departs from the rather bland 
assumption that shared culture underpinned merchant trust, arguing for the importance of the 
details of culture, and putting the argument in reverse: the way that these people did business 
was constitutive of their shared culture.  Shared culture may be the effect of long-distance 
trade, rather than simply the cause. Indeed this same argument appears in Paul Lovejoy’s 
discussion of Wangara trade diasporas in West Africa. Drawing on Cohen’s framework, 
Lovejoy gave it greater historical time depth through a consideration of the role of these 
traders in the development of long-distance commerce in the Hausa area.37 He suggests that 
from the sixteenth century onwards a well-established Wangara trading diaspora operated 
between Songhay and the Hausa cities: Wangara merchants travelled to Hausaland on 
                                                          
36 Phillip I. Ackerman-Lieberman, The Business of Identity: Jews, Muslims, and Economic 
Life in Medieval Egypt (Stanford: SUP, 2014), 85-6, 99-103. 
37 Paul Lovejoy, ‘The Role of the Wangara in the Economic Transformation of the Central 




commercial expeditions, importing gold and kola and buying textiles and leather goods for 
shipment to Songhay. Lovejoy believes that the traders promoted a common identity through 
religion, dress, language, intermarriage and similar social values, and suggests that it was 
through the Wangara that the trading diaspora system, based on a sense of cultural 
exclusiveness, was introduced to Hausaland. He also suggests that once the Hausa diaspora 
had started functioning, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many of the individuals 
born in and living in its dispersed settlements considered themselves to be foreigners with 
few connections to local societies.38  
 Whatever the strengths of the diaspora model, however, the relationship between 
‘culture’ (defined at the macro level of religion, kin or shared language) and trade is not 
nearly as simple as has been suggested.  The simple assumption that people of shared identity 
are inclined to trust one another has lately been criticized by, among others, Francesca 
Trivellato, who casts doubt on the ‘romanticized view of merchant communities as 
harmonious, cohesive, and full of pride’, while David Aslanian regrets that trust has been 
posited as a given attribute of communities, not a factor requiring historical explanation.39   
This affects the analysis of the examples we considered above.  The idea that commerce and 
Islam go hand in hand in West Africa is firmly entrenched in scholarship, but archaeological 
work continues to push back the date of trade contacts across the Sahara. In recent years, 
increasing numbers of imports, especially copper and glass, have been recovered in sites just 
south of the Sahara from deposits dating to AD 400–800, that is to say, in periods at least 
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partly prior to the development of the Muslim faith. The striking case here are the finds from 
the burial ground of Kissi, Burkina Faso, with graves of the fifth to seventh centuries 
containing goods such as glass beads, copper alloys, carnelian and other stone beads, cowries, 
textiles, and swords with trans-Saharan origins40.  Then we have some evidence of 
cooperation between merchants of different religions in formal associations, such as the 
League of Hunayn, which was based on the island of Mallorca and attempted to monopolize 
the wool trade between North Africa and southern Europe in the fourteenth century.  Up until 
1351 Jews and Christians were league members side by side, and Jews were only expelled in 
the wake of the well-poisoning accusations of the Black Death era which breached what trust 
had been established.41  In addition, ventures formally limited to co-religionists might often 
be made up of merchants from different polities or language communities.  For example the 
trade out of Southampton saw English, Dutch and Italian merchants happy to sail in ships 
captained by foreigners.42 
Clearly cultural ‘macro-motivations’ cannot explain everything.  Some elements of the 
diaspora model are very real – the sense of shared identity, the dispersal, the minority status 
and trade specialization – but none of this leads simply and directly to trust.  To say so is to 
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defer rather than to answer the question.43  A number of historians have lately dealt with this 
by locating the problem of trust in the day-to-day practices and experiences of trade, 
suggesting the need to examine the specific acts that constitute ‘culture’ (pace Ackerman-
Lieberman above).  This could be taken further by focussing on the issue of skills.  Kathryn 
Reyerson, in research on late-medieval Marseille, argues that ‘how merchants coped abroad 
was a harbinger of their business success or failure’, and pays attention to their ability to 
learn new behaviours and meet cultural expectations.  They joined local guilds and married 
local women in order to acquire ‘sufficient cultural baggage and language skills to gain the 
subtlety of approach necessary to do business.’44  As Laurence Fontaine has said, traders ‘had 
to know how to inspire trust to penetrate markets’, which is in agreement with Francesca 
Trivellato’s comment that visiting merchants had to improvise to find ways of ‘bartering, 
securing credit, and establishing durable commercial relations with persons who did not 
speak their language, wore different garb, and worshipped other gods.’45  Fontaine has shown 
how early modern traders invested in their appearance in order to build upon their social 
credit.  
Some micro-cultural competencies needed by participants in long-distance trade could 
be more specific to business: how to strike a bargain, knowing when a deal had been 
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concluded and when it had not.  Within certain cultural zones there was probably enough 
surface similarity in these practices for proficiency to be easily acquired.  For instance 
twelfth-century Europe witnessed a general shift from seeing sales purely as transfers of 
property to viewing them also as contracts imposing future obligations (to pay, to deliver 
goods and so on).  Merchants trading on credit or making advance payments relied on 
commonly-understood signs that a contract had been formed.  These tended to transcend 
linguistic frontiers, and prominent among them were hand clasps or slaps whose local 
variants could be learnt by observation.  Single coins of nominal value were also given and 
received in many places as symbolic ‘earnest money’ (England) or the ‘señal’ (Spain) to 
signal good faith, while the widespread notion of ‘God’s penny’ was intended as a charitable 
donation.  Drinking together (‘sale wine’) was a common European sign of a binding 
transaction, but understandably not so amongst Islamic traders (though there are hints that 
wine may have featured in Christian-Muslim transactions in some places).46  A Nuremberg 
‘conversation manual’ (Sprachlehrbuch) of 1424 provided German-speaking travelling 
merchants with role-play scenarios and useful phrases to enable them to make small-talk 
about the risks of travel and the price of goods with an Italian interlocutor, before concluding 
a deal over a shared drink.47  Guides such as this remind us that the creation of trust occurred 
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in specific moments, rather than simply arising naturally and ready-made from ‘culture’. We 
might say that the work of creating trust was the work of creating culture.  It was a matter of 
skills, knowledge, practices and learning, rather than possession of some essential similarity. 
The judicial records of some European polities provide opportunities to see this daily 
work of building trust and establishing reputation at moments when it was unravelling; these 
can be extremely revealing.  For instance, in a 1375 case against the merchant Joan Ribalta in 
the Aragonese royal court, all the witnesses who spoke on his behalf were involved in the 
long-distance trade between Iberia and the eastern Mediterranean, and had known one 
another for many years.  They were defending Ribalta’s reputation for honesty against 
accusations made by another merchant, Francesc Sa Plana, and they did so by launching a 
retaliatory attack against Sa Plana’s reputation, accusing him of excessive drinking and 
debauchery with prostitutes and female slaves.  Sa Plana’s original accusation against 
Ribalta, supported by the testimony of just one witness, had been that he had denied his 
Christian faith in order to live safely in the Mamluk sultanate.  In travelling, trading and 
living together, Damien Coulon argues, reputation and trust were essential to these 
merchants.48  The case reveals that adherence to one’s faith and control of personal appetites 
were significant components of reputation, and we might infer that continuous efforts to 
advertise constancy in religion and respectable living were pre-requisites for being 
considered trustworthy.  That reputations were built on perceptions of behaviour should 
demonstrate how meaningless ‘macro-motivations’ are as explanations for trust in long-
distance relationships.  Establishing a reputation for trustworthiness did not flow 
automatically from categories such as religious belonging, language community, or family 
membership.   
                                                          




There must have been cultural frontiers that merchants crossed, where learning how to 
trust and be seen as trustworthy became more arduous and precarious, but the possibility of 
acquiring such knowledge and skills contributed to the veneer of similarity or translatability 
that Patricia Crone suggests made pre-industrial culture ‘trans-local.’49  Some awareness of 
crossing frontiers of trust seems to lie behind many of the Islamic geographers’ writings 
about sub-Saharan Africa.  Theirs was an exercise in making the unknown less daunting, and 
instilling confidence in travellers.  Both Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldun50  often named 
informants, a practice which lent credence to their accounts while also reassuring the reader 
that there were outposts of familiar culture in distant lands.  Even when the informant is not 
stated, the language of trust comes in: ‘A trustworthy person informed me’, ‘This fact is well 
known to them; none of them deny it and it has been related by many trustworthy Muslims’, 
‘The trustworthy qadi of Sijilmāsa who had been employed as qadi in the land of Kawkaw 
and whom I met at Hunayn [formerly the port of Tlemcen] in 1374-5.’51 Similar literary 
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strategies of recording links, spinning a web of the known around the unknown, and building 
expectations can be seen in Christian works, such as the notebook of Francesco Pegolotti of 
the fourteenth-century Bardi company.  Pegolotti shared his extensive personal knowledge of 
English sheep farming, and ports from Morocco to Egypt, the Crimea, and Persia, as well as 
drawing on other sources to write about the road to Cathay, which lay beyond his sphere of 
operations.52  In short, much of the work of the medieval authors seems to be about making 
the unknown known. When al Bakri gives details of the road from Tamdult to Awdaghust, or 
Ibn Battuta describes daily life on the caravan, there is the sense they want to make the road 
familiar, known, to their readers.  
The personal letters and legal documents that survive from Mediterranean and northern 
European lands permit us to see the ways in which the articulation of trust was part of the 
maintenance of trusting relationships. The English wool trade once again provides a richly 
evidenced set of examples.  In 1276, Fountains Abbey in Yorkshire sold 62 sacks of wool to 
Dunelinus Jonte and Bernard Thecbaldi (who were acting on behalf of a group of Florentine 
merchants), saying ‘we promise’ to supply the wool in four annual instalments.  The monks 
undertook to return the payment along with any expenses, damages and interest, if they 
defaulted.  They made a big show of trust, saying that they would believe whatever the 
merchants said about such additional charges ‘by their simple word ... without oath or any 
other proof’:  a performance of trust intended to generate trust.  For their part the monks did 
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not ask to be trusted unconditionally in return, swearing to ‘firmly and faithfully’ honour the 
deal, mortgaging all their goods and property to the merchants until the completion of the 
sale, and renouncing any future use of the courts to wriggle out of the arrangements.53  We 
can see that the monks were consciously performing trust in order to be trusted in return. 
Remarkably similar practices existed in the Jewish merchant networks evidenced by the 
Geniza documents.54  In a partnership agreement made at Fustat in 1131 between Abu Zikri 
Judah b. Joseph ha-Kohen and Hananel b. Nissim the former noted that having placed a purse 
of money with the latter, he regarded him as ‘trustworthy as two proper and trustworthy 
witnesses’ and asserted himself to be ‘trustworthy concerning all the profit’ of their venture.55 
The phrase ‘trustworthy as two proper witnesses’ was in common usage, and there are also 
examples of declining to insist on oaths.56  Both Christian and Jewish partnership agreements 
rested on words and practices of trust (emunah, fides) that recalled the relationship between 
humans and the divine, and were also used in other social situations such as marriage 
ceremonies.57  Long-distance trust thus appears to have been constructed as an extension of 
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personal relationships with other people and God.  Of course we should not assume that talk 
about trust securely guaranteed another person’s behaviour, but nor can words and the 
feelings they engendered be excluded from consideration.  There were no absolute guarantees 
in any of the long-distance relationships studied here, and merchants had to build trust by a 
combination of careful behaviour, self-representation, effort at engendering feelings of 
obligation, reliance upon aspects of shared identity, and awareness of the potential for 
institutional support. 
All these elements of building trust were situated in time, that is, within relationships 
that changed over their duration, and which influenced and were influenced by other dynamic 
relationships.  As such trust must be seen as contingent, and as demanding constant effort.  
Historical contingency, and the physical interaction of the parties involved, can also be 
analysed in spatial terms, since trade was conducted at particular locations.  It is reasonable to 
hypothesise that the relationships of trade drew meaning from spaces and contributed to the 
meanings that those spaces embodied, at a range of scales.  
The most intimate level at which we can ‘see’ the conduct of trade is in various 
buildings and complexes specifically designated for the purpose.  Across all of northern 
Europe inns not only provided accommodation, food, and drink but also constituted spaces 
for the exchange of news and gossip and the establishment of commercial reputations.  
Furthermore many trade relationships involved the intercession of an intermediary, often in 
such spaces. Inn keepers were important vectors of local knowledge about trade, about other 
nodes in communications networks, and about the population of the surrounding area.  For 
example in 1474 the pilgrim-author Hans von Waldheim relied upon inn keepers to provide 
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him with information about the areas of the Swiss Confederation through which he was 
travelling, as well as a personal introduction (through a further intermediary) to a hermit near 
Bern, and loans of horses.58  In his experiences we see not only the traveller’s trusting 
reliance upon his host, but also the host’s business need to be trusted by his guests. 
For West Africa, the landlord and the broker are the obvious archetypes of the cross-
cultural middleman59. They have the same function: to welcome and accommodate the trader 
in foreign lands, to make business across cultural boundaries. These roles of landlord and 
broker often merged; as Polly Hill60 puts it simply, a landlord operating on the market was 
necessarily also a broker, and in the case of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Hausaland 
discussed by Paul Lovejoy61, accommodation was only an added attraction to the far more 
crucial brokerage activities of the landlord. One of the most remarkable archaeological 
recoveries of a potential landlord’s house was Peter Shinnie and Paul Ozanne’s excavation at 
‘Ruined Yendi’ in Ghana.62 Excavation of several large trenches uncovered a large, 
rectangular, possibly two-storey building with narrow rectangular rooms, and a walled and 
floored enclosure. Both the building and the enclosure are ‘quite alien in style to anything 
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known in the area today.’63 The complex is tentatively identified as ‘a strangers’ and 
merchants’ quarter’: the building potentially a storehouse, the enclosure a courtyard in which 
the caravans were unloaded. Tobacco pipes recovered suggest a date in the late seventeenth 
century and surface indications suggested there existed more structures such as these in the 
immediate area. 
The landlord-broker properties of West Africa bear some similarities with the 
Mediterranean institution known variously as the funduk or fondaco.  Each were meeting 
places for the conduct of trade, marked out by a distinct minority identity and the balance 
between a small permanent group of inhabitants and a larger number of temporary visitors 
who were often strangers.  Christian and Muslim foundations of this type in the 
Mediterranean were sometimes maintained by distant rulers and overseen by diplomatic 
officials, such as the Catalan fondacos in Beirut and Alexandria in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, but they were more commonly set up as charitable foundations with a 
duty to provide lodging for travellers, whether pilgrims or merchants.  There is evidence for a 
madrasa in Fustat, and possibly also a hostel for pilgrims, founded in the thirteenth century 
by the ruler of Kanem near Lake Chad.  Although it was common for merchants from 
different polities to use the establishments of co-religionists, many cities also contained 
multiple fondacos: for example Alexandria played host to separate houses for merchants from 
Florence, Ancona, Venice, Genoa, Ragusa, Palermo and Naples.64  Because these institutions 
created a degree of spatial separation between visiting merchants and the host community 
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they have been seen as a barrier between cultures,65  but separation could equally facilitate 
trust by making outsiders knowable and locatable, and by associating them with the 
community in which their reputation mattered.66  Individual reputations could be made and 
lost within the foreign merchant quarters where many a funduq was situated, a likelihood 
suggested by the commercial agreements, wills, and other acts recorded in Pietro 
Battifoglio’s 1289 ‘minute book’ of business deals amongst Christians in Tunis.  
Transactions were often notarized in one of the merchant fondaco establishments of the city, 
and it seems as though the Christian merchants were frequent visitors to each other’s hostels 
for these purposes.67  They may also have played host to some of the actual transactions 
between the minority and majority merchants, although this is hard to verify.68   
However, most transactions took place in more open and public settings.  Two major 
questions might guide future research into the relationship between merchant trust and space: 
first, what was the balance between transactions conducted in ‘private’ locations such as inns, 
landlord-broker properties and funduqs on the one hand, and public spaces such as markets 
on the other?  And second, what was the balance between collective will and external 
authority in providing oversight of these spaces and the activities within them?  Here we 
merely suggest some possible parameters.  In England markets were usually established by 
the authority of a lord, but were often, especially in towns, allowed a high degree of self-
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regulation by the community of residents classified as citizens or ‘burgesses’.  The market 
place might contain a market hall, perhaps associated with the town government or a leading 
guild, where market officials, weights and measures, and market courts might be located.  
The market place was subject to some political authority but its court typically operated only 
with the participation and consent of the leading merchants.  Selling imported goods outside 
the market place and hours was a crime, but a great deal of informal deal-making short of the 
final sale took place in private houses and on the road.  The market place was also a space 
consciously conceived of as ‘public’, where trust arguably depended on the concentration of 
sellers, buyers and witnesses in an open space with good visibility.69  The spaces of the 
English long-distance wool trade were also important, and when deliveries took place at the 
major regional fairs it was not just convenient, but also gave merchants confidence that the 
producers would want to be seen to be honest so as not to prejudice future deals.  This spatial 
constituent of long-distance trust was just a grander version of the way that marketplaces 
conditioned behaviour and expectations.  In some major European cities such as Bruges and 
Antwerp by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, purpose-built exchanges (bursa or bourses) 
created a more regulated space that was far less open, and less multi-purpose, than the typical 
market place.70 
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The marketplace has also been the focus of much research into the economic history of 
West Africa.71 However, despite the important social and daily role of the marketplace, it 
appears that it may not have been the main locus of activity in long-distance trade. Instead the 
private house was an important place of exchange, and this may be partly a result of the 
landlord system already mentioned. Polly Hill pointed out that the landlord system diverts 
much of the trade away from the market-place.72  Hugh Clapperton, in Kano in the 1820s, 
wrote  
The market is regulated with the greatest fairness and the regulations are strictly and 
impartially enforced. If a tobe [gown] or turkadee [woman’s cloth], purchased here, is 
carried to Bornou or any other distant place without being opened, and is there 
discovered to be of inferior quality, it is immediately sent back, as a matter of course, 
- the name of the dylala, or broker, being written inside every parcel. In this case the 
dylala must find out the seller, who, by the laws of Kano, is forthwith obliged to 
refund the purchase money.73 
Historians of trust might also profitably question the effects of the spatial patterning of 
trade on a larger scale.  For West Africa much has been made of the twin cities concept, 
relating to the idea that distinct groups occupied separate quarters. The late tenth-century 
Egyptian author al-Muhallabī describes the town of Gao at the Niger Bend as a twin 
settlement: one where there were markets and trading houses and to which there was 
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continuous traffic from all parts, and the other where the king and his men and those who 
have his confidence lived.74 Other medieval writers report the same situation , most famously 
al-Bakrī, who indeed also speaks of twin settlements for Ghana city (in present-day 
Mauritania): one large town possessing twelve mosques, inhabited by Muslims, then the 
kings’ town, six miles distant but with continuous habitations between them.75  
While it is hard to identify the origins (let alone intentions) behind the division of 
commercial and political functions between neighbouring settlements, the phenomenon is 
sufficiently widespread to justify reflection.  European parallels include the ‘twin capital’ 
condition of London (commerce) and Westminster (government) in late-medieval England, 
the separation of trade emporia from centres of political power across early-medieval 
northern Europe, and the isolation of trade, production, and status between neighbouring 
settlements within a network in Anglo-Saxon England.76  It is possible that these and similar 
configurations had the effect of stimulating long-distance trade by communicating local 
geographies of commerce to outsiders, and by striking a balance between distance and 
proximity in the relationship of rulers to traders.   
The geography of long-distance trade was, however, just as much about routes as about 
hubs.  Brokerage was not confined to fixed locations, taking place on board ships, at 
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quaysides, and on caravan routes, while the organisation of the Venetian shipping convoy or 
the trans-Saharan caravan must have shaped the formation of trust between merchants sharing 
the hardships of travel.  The spatial patterning of trust at mid-points on journeys is obviously 
harder to study because the archaeology is more ephemeral, and the journey typically 
produces less litigation and letter-writing than the market place. But archaeologists are 
increasingly turning their attention to such questions; archaeological investigations have for 
example been carried out at several sites critical to the history of trade routes into the 
Ghanaian forest.77 These must surely have left an archaeological signature, just going by a 
nineteenth-century description: 
When the caravan arrives at the village... it makes its way to a spot known  in advance 
where the unloading of men and animals is done, and immediately the configuration 
which the camp must have - it is always the same - is marked by the loads placed on 
the ground. In the next moment, while the slaves take the animals to water then to 
grazing, and the women visit the market and prepare the meal, all the men who are not 
watching over the loads go into the bush or forest to cut branches and fronds with 
which huts are immediately constructed; then... the camp is surrounded by a 
continuous barrier of the same materials.78 
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Crucially this signature is not most evident through trade goods – which pass through 
without being deposited in the archaeological record79 – but rather through the actual 
processes of trading. 
The difficulty in recovering even the physical spaces in which trade was conducted 
only serves to emphasize how provisional must be any attempt to capture trust between 
people.  But the attempt is crucial to any understanding of how long-distance relationships 
were possible in the global Middle Ages.  All cultures have ways of talking about trust, and 
while this indicates the presence of some universal elements that transcend cultural frontiers, 
the distinctive resonances of trusting and talking about trust in different times and places also 
matter.  However, this does not mean that shared culture on its own explains how trust is 
stretched across long distances.  Rather this involves the performance and active use of trust, 
in more or less conscious ways, within the framework of a particular relationship; such action 
is, moreover, not simply a mechanical reproduction of the social environment or a pre-
existing culture, but rather it is constitutive of whatever shared culture may exist.  Another 
way of putting this is that people draw upon the cultural resources available to them in pursuit 
of personal and shared goals, and in turn their successes and failures contribute to the store of 
ideas, images, behaviours and words available to others navigating similar situations. 
As an object of study the medieval globe comprises many comparable examples of the 
performance and use of trust in long-distance relationships.  The present study has shown that 
in quite disparate cultural circumstances trust was created out of the way traders negotiated 
the presence of institutional authorities, advertised personal probity, signalled membership of 
identifiable groups, used intermediaries, articulated their trust for one another, and made use 
of certain spaces in order to trust and be trusted.  Trust cannot be the result of some once-and-
                                                          




for-all cause or condition, be it economic rationality, shared identity, or a contract.  Here we 
have merely indicated the possibility and, we hope, the interest in comparing the creation of 
trust in a global medieval context.  Much more work remains to be done in comparing how 
different aspects of trust interacted in different circumstances, and what effects this had on 
patterns of trade and the relation of trade to social power and political structures.  The 
framework within which such comparisons are undertaken must reflect similarity as well as 
difference: much of what we have found here demonstrates the inadequacy of simple 
accounts of a transition from an unconnected pre-modern to a connected modern world.  For 
example, the way that European merchant companies are firmly entrenched in the 
institutional ‘History of the Firm’ while Jewish, Hausa, and Wangara merchants are 
somewhat disparagingly left in the historical cul-de-sac of ‘diaspora trade’, is arguably a 
phantom of western exceptionalism, which a global medieval approach can helpfully 
disrupt.80  Our emphasis on the ‘work’ of trust has also suggested that there was no separate 
repertoire of trust practices in short- and long-distance relationships.  Both demanded effort, 
skill and an ability to learn. 
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